An alternative characterization of top trading cycles

An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
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顶级交易周期的另一种描述

DOI:
10.1007/s00199-012-0713-3
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发表时间:
2013
期刊:
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
T. Morrill
T. Morrill
中科院分区:
经济学3区
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--
作者:
T. Morrill

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本文介绍了TOP交易周期算法的两个新特征。我们刻画的关键是一个新的条件,无关排名的独立性(IIR)。直观地说,如果一个代理在一个对象上的排名与她的分配无关,那么它与所有代理的分配无关,那么一个机制就满足IIR。我们证明了一个机制是帕累托有效的,无策略的,IIR的,当且仅当它是最大交易周期时,才能满足互惠最优。这为顶级交易周期与所有其他有效且不受策略影响的分配机制的区别提供了新的见解。我们给出了弱Maskin单调性的第二个刻画。一个机制满足帕累托有效性、弱Maskin单调性、IIR和共同最优当且仅当它是最大交易周期。这使得我们可以直接将顶级交易周期与延迟接受算法在弱Maskin单调性方面的已知特征进行比较。
This paper introduces two new characterizations of the top trading cycles algorithm. The key to our characterizations is a new condition, independence of irrelevant rankings (IIR). Intuitively, a mechanism satisfies IIR if whenever an agent’s ranking at an object is irrelevant to her assignment, then it is irrelevant to the assignment of all agents. We demonstrate that a mechanism is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, IIR, and satisfies mutual best if and only if it is top trading cycles. This provides a new insight into what distinguishes top trading cycles from all other efficient and strategy-proof assignment mechanisms. We provide a second characterization in terms of weak Maskin monotonicity. A mechanism satisfies Pareto efficiency, weak Maskin monotonicity, IIR, and mutual best if and only if it is top trading cycles. This allows us to directly compare top trading cycles to known characterizations of the deferred acceptance algorithm in terms of weak Maskin monotonicity.
剑桥:剑桥大学出版社
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作者:
Shirai;Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)
通讯作者: Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)