An Approach to General Proof Theory and a Conjecture of a Kind of Completeness of Intuitionistic Logic Revisited
An Approach to General Proof Theory and a Conjecture of a Kind of Completeness of Intuitionistic Logic Revisited
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一般证明论的一种进路和一种直觉逻辑完备性的重温猜想
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
D. Prawitz
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作者：
D. Prawitz
30年前，我提出了一个关于直觉逻辑完备性的猜想。该猜想的框架是以语义学方法的形式来描述一般的证明理论（在1971年布加勒斯特举行的第四届世界逻辑、方法论和科学哲学大会上提出[6]）。在本章中，我将重新考虑这个30年前的猜想，它至今仍未得到解决，但我仍然认为它是一个可信的重要假设。重新考虑这个猜想，我也将重新考虑和修改提出这个猜想的语义学方法。
Thirty years ago I formulated a conjecture about a kind of completeness of intuitionistic logic. The framework in which the conjecture was formulated had the form of a semantic approach to a general proof theory (presented at the 4th World Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Bucharest 1971 [6]). In the present chapter, I shall reconsider this 30-year old conjecture, which still remains unsettled, but which I continue to think of as a plausible and important supposition. Reconsidering the conjecture, I shall also reconsider and revise the semantic approach in which the conjecture was formulated.