Model-Measurement Data Integrity Attacks
Model-Measurement Data Integrity Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2023.3253781
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发表时间：
2023-11
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
Gang Cheng;Yuzhang Lin;Jun Yan;Junbo Zhao;Linquan Bai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gang Cheng;Yuzhang Lin;Jun Yan;Junbo Zhao;Linquan Bai
信息通信技术（ICT）基础设施的脆弱性为网络攻击提供了空间，威胁到电力系统的可靠运行。基于乌克兰电网被攻击的真实证据和目前流行的网络攻击可以从控制中心层面发起的技术讨论，本文提出了一种新的攻击策略：模型测量数据完整性（MMI）攻击。而不是妥协测量，我们研究了网络参数被协调操纵的可能性，当构造虚假数据注入攻击（FDIA）向量。此外，我们模拟了网络攻击者在启动fdia之前共同规划被操纵的测量通道和参数攻击向量的可能行为。所揭示的MMI攻击策略允许在运行时大幅减少测量通道以保持隐身性。在IEEE 14总线测试系统和IEEE 118总线测试系统上的仿真验证了所提出的MMI攻击策略的可行性。
The vulnerabilities of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures leave room for cyber attacks threatening the reliable operations of power systems. Based on the real-world evidence of the Ukraine power grid attack and the popular technical discussion that cyber attacks could be launched at the control-center level, this paper reveals a new attack strategy: model-measurement data integrity (MMI) attack. Instead of compromising measurements only, we investigate the possibility where network parameters are coordinately manipulated when constructing false data injection attack (FDIA) vectors. Furthermore, we model cyber adversaries’ possible behavior of co-planning the manipulated measurement channels and parameter attack vectors prior to the launch of FDIAs. The revealed MMI attack strategy allows a drastic reduction of measurement channels to compromise in run-time for keeping the stealth property. Simulations in the IEEE 14-bus test system and the IEEE 118-bus test system demonstrate the feasibility of the revealed MMI attack strategy.