Feasibility and Infeasibility of Secure Computation with Malicious PUFs

Feasibility and Infeasibility of Secure Computation with Malicious PUFs
复制标题

恶意PUF安全计算的可行性和不可行性

DOI:
10.1007/s00145-019-09329-9
复制
发表时间:
2014
影响因子:
3
通讯作者:
Dominique Schröder
Dominique Schröder
中科院分区:
计算机科学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Dana Dachman;Nils Fleischhacker;Jonathan Katz;Anna Lysyanskaya;Dominique Schröder

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

最近一系列的研究探索了物理不可克隆函数(PUF)在安全计算中的应用,其目标是(1)在无需额外设置的情况下实现通用可组合性和/或(2)获得无条件安全性(即避免复杂性理论假设)。最初的研究假设所有的PUF,即使是攻击者制造的,都是诚实生成的。随后,研究人员研究了攻击者能够制造具有任意行为的恶意PUF的模型。研究人员既考虑了可能有状态的恶意PUF,也考虑了可以有任意行为但保证无状态的恶意PUF。我们解决了关于恶意PUF模型中安全计算的主要开放性问题:我们证明,如果攻击者能够构造(恶意)有状态的PUF,即使在独立设置的情况下,无条件安全的不经意传输也是不可能的。我们表明,如果攻击者仅限于制造(恶意)无状态的PUF,那么无条件地实现通用可组合的双方计算是可能的。我们证明,如果攻击者能够构造(恶意)有状态的PUF,即使在独立设置的情况下,无条件安全的不经意传输也是不可能的。我们表明,如果攻击者仅限于制造(恶意)无状态的PUF,那么无条件地实现通用可组合的双方计算是可能的。
A recent line of work has explored the use of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) for secure computation, with the goals of (1) achieving universal composability without additional setup and/or (2) obtaining unconditional security (i.e., avoiding complexity-theoretic assumptions). Initial work assumed that all PUFs, even those created by an attacker, are honestly generated. Subsequently, researchers have investigated models in which an adversary can create malicious PUFs with arbitrary behavior. Researchers have considered both malicious PUFs that might be stateful, as well as malicious PUFs that can have arbitrary behavior but are guaranteed to be stateless. We settle the main open questions regarding secure computation in the malicious-PUF model: We prove that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is impossible, even in the stand-alone setting, if the adversary can construct (malicious) stateful PUFs. We show that if the attacker is limited to creating (malicious) stateless PUFs, then universally composable two-party computation is possible, unconditionally. We prove that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is impossible, even in the stand-alone setting, if the adversary can construct (malicious) stateful PUFs. We show that if the attacker is limited to creating (malicious) stateless PUFs, then universally composable two-party computation is possible, unconditionally.