On Resilience and Connectivity of Secure Wireless Sensor Networks Under Node Capture Attacks
On Resilience and Connectivity of Secure Wireless Sensor Networks Under Node Capture Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/tifs.2016.2613841
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发表时间：
2017-03
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Jun Zhao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jun Zhao
尽管在过去的十年中，人们对无线传感器网络的概率密钥预分配方案进行了大量的研究，但很少有正式的分析来精确地定义该方案在现实条件下对节点捕获攻击的恢复能力。分析了$q$-复合密钥预分配方案在邻居发现阶段缓解Eschenauer-Gligor方案节点捕获漏洞的弹性。我们推导出具有期望水平的弹性的方案参数，并获得尽可能防御不同对手的最优参数。我们还表明，该方案可以很容易地被增强，以获得与针对邻居发现后发起的攻击的随机成对密钥预分配相同的“完美弹性”性质。尽管该方案受到了相当大的关注，但许多以前的工作显式或隐式地使用了对节点捕获攻击下链路危害概率的错误计算，并且忽略了真实世界中传感器节点的传输约束。此外，我们还推导了在没有节点捕获攻击和存在节点捕获攻击的情况下确保连通性的关键网络参数。我们还通过分析对手的最优策略来研究节点复制攻击。
Despite much research on probabilistic key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks over the past decade, few formal analyses exist that define schemes’ resilience to node-capture attacks precisely and under realistic conditions. In this paper, we analyze the resilience of the $q$ -composite key predistribution scheme, which mitigates the node capture vulnerability of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme in the neighbor discovery phase. We derive scheme parameters to have a desired level of resiliency, and obtain optimal parameters that defend against different adversaries as much as possible. We also show that this scheme can be easily enhanced to achieve the same “perfect resilience” property as in the random pairwise key predistribution for attacks launched after neighbor discovery. Despite considerable attention to this scheme, much prior work explicitly or implicitly uses an incorrect computation for the probability of link compromise under node-capture attacks and ignores the real-world transmission constraints of sensor nodes. Moreover, we derive the critical network parameters to ensure connectivity in both the absence and presence of node-capture attacks. We also investigate node replication attacks by analyzing the adversary’s optimal strategy.