Congestion tolling — Dollars versus tokens: Within-day dynamics

Congestion tolling — Dollars versus tokens: Within-day dynamics
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DOI:
10.1016/j.trc.2022.103836
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发表时间:
2022-10
期刊:
Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Ravi Seshadri;A. de Palma;M. Ben-Akiva
Ravi Seshadri;A. de Palma;M. Ben-Akiva
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ravi Seshadri;A. de Palma;M. Ben-Akiva

文献摘要

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可交易信用计划(或代币收费)是一种数量控制形式,由于考虑到收入中立,公平,降低基础设施成本和政治可接受性,它有望成为拥堵定价(或美元收费)的一种有吸引力的替代方案。在供需不确定的情况下,这两种工具的比较性能只是最近才在运输环境中受到关注,尽管对排放市场进行了广泛的研究。在本文中,我们通过考虑出发时间背景下的可交易信贷计划来补充这一文献,其中监管机构为用户提供了代币的初始捐赠,并在特定时间段内产生代币费用(在所有出发之前确定)。代币可以在市场内以由代币需求和供应内生决定的价格买卖。该市场模型的两个关键特征是:(1)通过每个时期的平滑市场清算机制明确建模价格的日时动态,以及(2)明确建模用户的销售决策,这些决策决定了一天内市场中代币供应的分布。这使得我们能够研究销售行为对信用系统绩效的影响。出行需求使用logit混合模型建模,供给由静态拥堵组成。随机需求下的大量实验表明,当通行费(美元和代币)不是日常自适应的时,当拥堵影响更严重时(例如,现实的BPR模型和陡峭的拥堵功能,高需求水平和高日常变化)。重要的是,我们发现,这一结果是稳健的销售行为在市场上,虽然有可能在数量控制系统的福利损失时,在市场上的销售行为是过度的非理性。这些发现强调了在设计可交易信贷计划时,研究分类市场行为的重要性。此外,当代币的供应可以每天适应时,信用系统在所有测试场景中都是上级的,前提是个人的销售行为是理性的。最后,即使在价格工具中的通行费收入被平均重新分配的情况下(在实践中通常很难),在拥堵影响更严重的情况下,代币收费(当代币被平均分配时)也会稍微更公平。这些发现为代币收费提供了依据。
Tradable credit schemes (or tolling in tokens) are a form of quantity control, which promise to be an appealing alternative to congestion pricing (or tolling in dollars) owing to considerations of revenue neutrality, equity, reduced infrastructure costs, and political acceptability. The comparative performance of the two instruments under uncertainty in demand and supply has only recently received attention in the transportation setting, despite being widely studied for emission markets. In this paper, we add to this literature by considering a tradable credit scheme in a departure time context wherein users are provided an initial endowment of tokens by the regulator and incur a token charge (determined prior to all departures) to travel in a specific time-period. Tokens can be bought and sold within a marketplace at a price determined endogenously by token demand and supply. Two key features of the market model are: (1) the time-of-day dynamics of price is explicitly modeled through a smooth market clearing mechanism in each period, and (2) the selling decisions of users, which determine the distribution of token supply in the market over the day are explicitly modeled. This enables us to study the impact of selling behavior on performance of the credit system. Travel demand is modeled using a logit mixture model and supply consists of static congestion.Extensive experiments under stochastic demand show that when the tolls (in dollars and tokens) are not day-to-day adaptive, tolling in tokens outperforms tolling in dollars when congestion effects are more severe (e.g., realistic BPR models and steep congestion functions, high demand levels and high day-to-day variability). Importantly, we find that this result is robust with respect to selling behavior in the market, although there can be welfare losses in the quantity control system when selling behavior in the market is excessively irrational. These findings underscore the importance of examining disaggregate market behavior when designing tradable credit schemes. Moreover, when the supply of tokens can be adapted from day to day, the credit system was found to be superior in all tested scenarios, provided the selling behavior of individuals is rational. Finally, even in the case when toll revenues in the price instrument are equally redistributed (often difficult in practice), tolling in tokens (when tokens are equally distributed) is marginally more equitable in scenarios where congestion effects are more severe. These findings make a case for tolling in tokens.