Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting
Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting
复制标题
货币政策委员会和利率制定
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.05.002
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Petra Gerlach
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Petra Gerlach
本文表明，如果潜在产出存在不确定性，货币政策最好由委员会而不是单一政策制定者来实施。我们研究了三种决策程序——最优程序、平均和投票——并发现，如果政策制定者的技能不同，后者是做出决策的适当方式。最后，我们证明有效的决策程序可以减少冲击的持续性。
This paper shows that it is preferable for monetary policy to be conducted by a committee instead of a single policy maker if there is uncertainty about potential output. We examine three decision procedures – an optimal procedure, averaging and voting – and find that the latter is the appropriate way to reach decisions if policy makers are not equally skilled. Finally, we demonstrate that efficient decision procedures reduce the persistence of shocks.