Securitization and Lending Competition
Securitization and Lending Competition
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证券化和借贷竞争
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2018077
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yu Jin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Frankel;Yu Jin
我们研究了当银行看到当地申请人还款机会的私人信号时，证券化对银行同业拆借竞争的影响。如果银行不能进行证券化，结果是有效的：它们将贷款发放给最有信誉的当地申请者。有了证券化，银行也会贷款给那些具有很强可观察性的远程申请人，以减轻他们在出售证券时面临的柠檬问题。这种对可观察数据的依赖是不合理的，会提高平均违约风险，并可能导致信用评分的欺骗性上升。
We study the eects of securitization on interbank lending competition when banks see private signals of local applicants' repayment chances. If banks cannot securitize, the outcome is e¢ cient: they lend to their most creditworthy local applicants. With securitization, banks lend also to remote applicants with strong observables in order to lessen the lemons problem they face in selling their securities. This reliance on observables is ine¢ cient, raises the mean default risk, and may lead to a deceptive rise in credit scores.