Administrative Cohesion and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia and Ukraine
Administrative Cohesion and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia and Ukraine
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格鲁吉亚和乌克兰的行政凝聚力和反腐败改革
DOI：
10.1080/09668136.2016.1192107
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Peter T. Nasuti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Peter T. Nasuti
摘要以前对前共产主义国家的研究将权力下放与更大的改革可能性联系在一起。然而，对格鲁吉亚和乌克兰在各自的“颜色革命”后的反腐败运动的分析表明，格鲁吉亚更大的中央集权是其成功实施反腐败措施不可或缺的一部分。在解释为什么会出现这种相互矛盾的结果时，本文认为，只要执政政府的背景和偏好有利于改革，中央政府在实施改革方面可能比分散政府更有效。
Abstract Previous studies of former communist countries have linked decentralisation of power to a greater likelihood of reform. An analysis of the anti-corruption drives in Georgia and Ukraine after their respective ‘colour revolutions’, however, suggests that Georgia’s greater centralisation was integral to its success in enacting anti-corruption measures. In explaining why this contradictory result happened, this article argues that a centralised government can be more effective at implementing reforms than a decentralised one as long as the background and preferences of the ruling administration are conducive to change.