Britain’s Electricity Capacity Auctions: Lessons from Colombia and New England
Britain’s Electricity Capacity Auctions: Lessons from Colombia and New England
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英国的电力拍卖：哥伦比亚和新英格兰的经验教训
DOI：
10.1016/j.tej.2014.05.004
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Marco Pagnozzi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David Harbord;Marco Pagnozzi
为了实现有效的长期发电投资，是否需要政府组织的发电能力市场，目前还没有定论。然而，在引入新的容量市场时，重要的是要精心设计，并考虑到现有的经验和以前的设计失败。哥伦比亚和新英格兰的经验对将递减时钟拍卖置于电力容量市场中心的危险性提出了严厉的警告。在可供选择的拍卖设计方案中，密封投标拍卖是一个更好的选择。
The jury is still out on the need for government-organized capacity markets in order to achieve efficient long-run investments in electricity generation. When new capacity markets are introduced, however, it is important that they are well designed and take account of existing experience and previous design failures. Experience in both Colombia and New England provide a stark warning about the dangers of placing descending clock auctions at the center of electricity capacity markets. Among alternative auction design options, a sealed-bid auction is a better choice.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
KLEMPERER, PD;MEYER, MA
通讯作者：
MEYER, MA