Agricultural Marketing Institutions: A Response to Quality Disputes
Agricultural Marketing Institutions: A Response to Quality Disputes
复制标题
农产品营销机构：质量纠纷的应对
DOI：
10.2202/1542-0485.1035
复制
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Dimitri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Dimitri
农产品的销售受等级和检查的制约。在19世纪末和20世纪初，当全国性的市场刚刚出现时，联邦立法创造了市场机构。三种商品--新鲜农产品（水果和蔬菜）、谷物和肉类--都依赖于类似的机构，这表明它们在每个市场中扮演着类似的角色。对这三类产品的检验立法之前的事件进行追踪，发现买卖双方之间的交易质量纠纷存在于水果、蔬菜和粮食市场，而肉类销售链沿着的交易则不存在此类纠纷。有证据表明，这些机构在水果、蔬菜和谷物部门履行同样的职能（解决质量问题），而肉类检查则服务于不同的目的，随着时间的推移而变化。随着合同和纵向协调的市场渠道在新鲜农产品和粮食行业变得越来越普遍，声誉效应可能能够强制执行合同，减少检查的必要性。肉类检查很可能会继续需要，以确保肉类供应的卫生和安全。
Grades and inspections govern the marketing of agricultural commodities. Federal legislation created the marketing institutions, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when national markets were emerging. Three commodities fresh produce (fruit and vegetables), grains, and meat all rely on similar institutions, suggesting they serve a similar role in each market. Tracing the events prior to the legislation of inspection for the three product groups reveals that disputes over quality in transactions between buyers and sellers were present in the fruit and vegetable and grain markets, while transactions along the meat marketing chain were not subject to such disputes. Evidence suggests that the institutions performed the same functions in the fruit and vegetable and grain sectors (solve quality problems), while meat inspections served different purposes that varied over time. As contracts and vertically coordinated market channels become more common in the fresh produce and grain industries, reputation effects will likely be able to enforce contracts, reducing the need for inspection. Meat inspection most likely will continue to be required to ensure sanitation and safety of the meat supply.