The survival of the welfare state
The survival of the welfare state
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DOI：
10.1257/000282803321455179
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发表时间：
2003-03-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Zilibotti, F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hassler, J;Mora, JVR;Zilibotti, F
本文提供了重复投票模型中马尔可夫完美均衡的分析特征，其中代理人对扭曲的收入再分配进行投票。一个关键结果是，再分配政策的未来选区积极取决于当前的再分配，因为这会影响私人投资和未来选民的分配。该模型具有多个平衡点。在某些均衡中，正向再分配会永远持续下去。在其他均衡中，即使是再分配的大多数受益者也会进行战略性投票，以促使下一个时期福利国家的结束。偏向技能的技术变革使得福利国家的生存可能性更小。
This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely.