Mandatory Audit Firm Turnover, Financial Reporting Quality, and Client Bargaining Power: The Case of Arthur Andersen
Mandatory Audit Firm Turnover, Financial Reporting Quality, and Client Bargaining Power: The Case of Arthur Andersen
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强制性审计公司营业额、财务报告质量和客户议价能力：安达信案例
DOI：
10.2308/acch.2005.19.2.51
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Albert L. Nagy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Albert L. Nagy
本文考察了在安达信(Arthur Andersen)破产所营造的独特环境中，强制变更审计师对审计质量的影响。AA的失败迫使相当多的公司(前AA客户)更换审计师，也有助于增加对外部审计表现出的总体怀疑。强制审计师制度的消亡并没有真正复制强制性轮换制度，但它确实提供了一个丰富的环境来审查这种制度的一个方面--强制更换审计师对审计质量水平的影响。此外，由于前AA客户被迫一次性更换审计师，未来不一定要更换审计师，客户的讨价还价能力可能会影响审计师的行为，并在本研究的实证分析中得到考虑。本研究证明，对于较小的公司，被迫从AA转换的公司的审计质量水平有所提高，审计师任期较短与审计质量之间存在负相关关系。
This paper examines the effect of mandatory auditor change on audit quality in the unique environment created by the failure of Arthur Andersen (AA). The failure of AA forced a significant number of companies (ex‐AA clients) to change auditors and also helped increase the overall skepticism exhibited on external audits. The demise of AA does not truly replicate a mandatory rotation regime, but it does provide a rich setting to examine one aspect of such a regime—the effect that a forced auditor change has on the level of audit quality. Furthermore, because ex‐AA clients were forced to change auditors on a one‐time basis and will not necessarily have to change auditors in the future, client bargaining power is likely to influence auditor behavior and is considered in this study's empirical analyses. This study provides evidence that, for smaller companies, the level of audit quality improved for companies forced to switch from AA, and that the negative relation between short auditor tenure and audit qualit...