Trade and the (Dis)Incentive to Reform Labor Markets: The Case of Reform in the European Union
Trade and the (Dis)Incentive to Reform Labor Markets: The Case of Reform in the European Union
复制标题
贸易与劳动力市场改革的（抑制）激励：欧盟改革案例
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.606644
复制
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Alain Delacroix
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
George Alessandria;Alain Delacroix
在一个封闭的经济一般均衡模型中，HOpenhayn和Rogerson(1993)发现，取消射击限制会带来巨大的福利收益。我们探讨国际贸易在多大程度上改变了这一结果。当经济进行贸易时，一个国家的劳动力市场政策会通过贸易条件的变化而溢出到其他国家。这降低了改革劳动力市场的动力。在国与国之间关于开征税收的政策博弈中，我们发现，各国最优选择了正水平的开征税收。协调取消解雇税会带来相当大的好处。这一见解为欧盟最近在劳动力市场改革方面的努力提供了一些解释
In a closed economy general equilibrium model, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) find large welfare gains to removing firing restrictions. We explore the extent to which international trade alters this result. When economies trade, labor market policies in one country spill over to other countries through a change in the terms of trade. This reduces the incentive to reform labor markets. In a policy game over firing taxes between countries, we find that countries optimally choose positive levels of firing taxes. A coordinated elimination of firing taxes yields considerable benefits. This insight provides some explanation for recent efforts toward labor market reform in the European Union