Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries

Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries
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监管中介机构理论化

DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Snidal
D. Snidal
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
Kenneth W. Abbott;D. Levi‐Faur;D. Snidal

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监管通常被认为是规则制定者或监管者 (R) 与规则接受者或目标 (T) 之间的两方关系。我们制定了将监管研究为三方（或多方）关系的议程，其中中介机构（I）处于分析的中心。中介机构在监管中发挥着重要而多样的作用，从提供专业知识和反馈到促进实施，从监控监管目标的行为到建立保证和信任社区。在开发了基本的监管者-中介-目标（RIT）模型之后，我们讨论了该模型的重要扩展和变化。然后我们讨论中介机构参与时可能出现的各种监管捕获。
Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) model, we discuss important extensions and variations of the model. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that may appear where intermediaries are involved.