Sampling Best Response Dynamics and Deterministic Equilibrium Selection
Sampling Best Response Dynamics and Deterministic Equilibrium Selection
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1985856
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发表时间：
2014-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Daisuke Oyama;William H. Sandholm;Olivier Tercieux
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daisuke Oyama;William H. Sandholm;Olivier Tercieux
我们考虑了一个游戏进化模型，在这个模型中，一个修正代理观察随机抽样的对手的随机数量的行动，然后选择一个样本中行动分布的最佳响应。我们给出了样本大小分布的一个条件，在这个条件下迭代p-优势平衡在这些动力学下几乎是全局渐近稳定的。在样本大小分布的附加条件下，我们证明了在超模对策中，几乎全局渐近稳定状态必须是迭代p优势均衡。由于我们的选择结果是确定性动力学的，任何选择的平衡都是快速达到的；不存在随机稳定模型中与均衡选择相关的长等待时间。
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in supermodular games, an almost globally asymptotically stable state must be an iterated p-dominant equilibrium. Since our selection results are for deterministic dynamics, any selected equilibrium is reached quickly; the long waiting times associated with equilibrium selection in stochastic stability models are absent.