Evolution of Fairness and Group Formation in Multi-Player Ultimatum Games
Evolution of Fairness and Group Formation in Multi-Player Ultimatum Games
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发表时间：
2015-08
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通讯作者：
Takeshi Nishimura;Akira Okada;Yasuhiro Shirata
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作者：
Takeshi Nishimura;Akira Okada;Yasuhiro Shirata
群体形成是人类社会的一项基本活动。人类经常将其他人排除在群体之外，只在群体成员之间公平地分配群体利益。这种分配称为组内公平。自然选择是否有利于群体内的公平分配？我们研究了公平性和群体形成在一个三人最后通牒博弈（UG）中的演化，其中群体的价值取决于它的大小。在频率依赖的莫兰过程的随机模型中，自然选择有利于在低突变极限下形成两人子群，如果其组值超过最大组值的高比例（0.7）。随机进化博弈理论为解释三人普遍群体经济实验中人类主体的行为提供了理论支持。
Group formation is a fundamental activity in human society. Humans often exclude others from a group and divide the group benefit in a fair way only among group members. Such an allocation is called in-group fair. Does natural selection favor an in-group fair allocation? We investigate the evolution of fairness and group formation in a three-person Ultimatum Game (UG) in which the group value depends on its size. In a stochastic model of the frequency-dependent Moran process, natural selection favors the formation of a two-person subgroup in the low mutation limit if its group value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest group. Stochastic evolutionary game theory provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person UG.