Unprovable Security of Perfect NIZK and Non-interactive Non-malleable Commitments
Unprovable Security of Perfect NIZK and Non-interactive Non-malleable Commitments
复制标题
完美 NIZK 的无法证明的安全性和非交互的不可延展的承诺
DOI：
10.1007/s00037-016-0122-2
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
R. Pass
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Pass
我们提出了两个重要的密码原语，完美的非交互式零知识（NIZK）和非交互式不可诉承诺的可证明安全性的障碍：○黑盒约简不能用于证明自适应可靠性（即，即使要证明的陈述被选择为公共参考串的函数，该可靠性也是成立的）基于任何“标准”棘手性假设的NP的任何统计NIZK。基于任何“标准”的承诺计划棘手的假设。我们强调，上述分离适用，即使所考虑的基元的构造使得潜在假设的非黑盒使用。作为独立贡献，我们提出了一个基于博弈的棘手性假设的分类。
We present barriers to provable security of two important cryptographic primitives,perfect non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK)andnon-interactive non-alleable commitments:○Black-box reductions cannot be used to demonstrateadaptivesoundness (i.e., that soundness holds even if the statement to be proven is chosen as a function of the common reference string) of any statistical NIZK forNPbased on any “standard” intractability assumptions.○Black-box reductions cannot be used to demonstrate non-malleability of non-interactive, or even 2-message, commitment schemes based on any “standard” intractability assumptions.We emphasize that the above separations apply even if the construction of the considered primitives makes anon-black-boxuse of the underlying assumption.As an independent contribution, we suggest a taxonomy of game-based intractability assumptions.