FROM TOOLS TO THEORIES - A HEURISTIC OF DISCOVERY IN COGNITIVE-PSYCHOLOGY
FROM TOOLS TO THEORIES - A HEURISTIC OF DISCOVERY IN COGNITIVE-PSYCHOLOGY
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.98.2.254
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发表时间：
1991-04-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
GIGERENZER, G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
GIGERENZER, G
科学发现的研究--新思想从何而来？长期以来一直被哲学家诋毁为与分析科学知识的增长无关。 特别是，人们对认知理论是如何被发现的知之甚少，对发现的经典解释也不是概率归纳（例如，赖兴巴赫，1938年）或幸运的猜测（例如，波普尔，1959年），也没有关于突然“尤里卡”时刻的股票轶事加深了对发现的洞察力。 在这篇评论中采取了一种启发式的方法，其中启发式被理解为发现的策略，比假设的独特的发现逻辑更不一般，但比幸运的猜测更普遍。 本文讨论了科学家的工具如何塑造心理理论，特别是统计推断方法如何转变为心理隐喻。 从工具到理论的启发式解释了从20世纪60年代认知革命到现在的广泛认知理论的出现，它可以用来检测当前认知理论的局限性和新的发展路线，这些理论将心灵作为“直觉统计学家”进行研究。"
The study of scientific discovery-where do new ideas come from?-has long been denigrated by philosophers as irrelevant to analyzing the growth of scientific knowledge. In particular, little is known about how cognitive theories are discovered, and neither the classical accounts of discovery as either probabilistic induction (e.g., Reichenbach, 1938) or lucky guesses (e.g., Popper, 1959), nor the stock anecdotes about sudden "eureka" moments deepen the insight into discovery. A heuristics approach is taken in this review, where heuristics are understood as strategies of discovery less general than a supposed unique logic of discovery but more general than lucky guesses. This article deals with how scientists' tools shape theories of mind, in particular with how methods of statistical inference have turned into metaphors of mind. The tools-to-theories heuristic explains the emergence of a broad range of cognitive theories, from the cognitive revolution of the 1960s up to the present, and it can be used to detect both limitations and new lines of development in current cognitive theories that investigate the mind as an "intuitive statistician."