FairMM: A Fast and Frontrunning-Resistant Crypto Market-Maker
FairMM: A Fast and Frontrunning-Resistant Crypto Market-Maker
复制标题
FairMM：快速且抗抢先交易的加密货币做市商
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-031-07689-3_31
复制
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Vassilis Zikas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michele Ciampi;M. Ishaq;M. Magdon;R. Ostrovsky;Vassilis Zikas
。前沿是Defi应用程序中的一个主要问题，例如基于区块链的交易所。然而，现有的解决方案并不实用，而且/或者它们建立了外部信任假设。在这项工作中，我们提出了一种基于做市商的密码令牌交换方案，它比现有的解决方案更有效，并提供了对前沿攻击的可证明的抵抗。我们的方法巧妙地将做市商的博弈论分析与新的加密和区块链工具结合起来，以防御交易所可能抢先运行的所有三种方式，即(1)重新排序交易请求，(2)自适应地放弃交易请求，以及(3)自适应地插入(自己的)交易请求。具体地说，我们提出了新的轻量级加密工具和智能合同强制激励来消除重新排序攻击，并确保丢弃请求必须忽略(不通知)实际交易。然后我们证明，随着这些攻击的消除，所谓的垄断做市商不再有增加或减少交易的动机。我们已经实施了我们的交易所并对其进行了基准测试，并提供了其相对于现有解决方案的优势的具体证据。
. Frontrunning is a major problem in DeFi applications, such as blockchain-based exchanges. Albeit, existing solutions are not practical and/or they make external trust assumptions. In this work we propose a market-maker-based crypto-token exchange, which is both more efficient than existing solutions and offers provable resistance to frontrunning attack. Our approach combines in a clever way a game theoretic analysis of market-makers with new cryptography and blockchain tools to defend against all three ways by which an exchange might front-run, i.e., (1) reorder trade requests, (2) adaptively drop trade requests, and (3) adaptively insert (its own) trade requests. Concretely, we propose novel light-weight cryptographic tools and smart-contract-enforced incentives to eliminate reordering attacks and ensure that dropping requests have to be oblivious (uninformed) of the actual trade. We then prove that with these attacks eliminated, a so-called monopolistic market-maker has no longer incentives to add or drop trades. We have implemented and benchmarked our exchange and provide concrete evidence of its advantages over existing solutions.