Endogenous Role in Mixed Markets: A Two-Production-Period Model
Endogenous Role in Mixed Markets: A Two-Production-Period Model
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DOI：
10.2307/3648977
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发表时间：
2003-10
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura
在本文中，我调查的内生作用在一个混合的双寡头垄断，私人和国有上市公司竞争，允许两个生产阶段。我发现，存在许多均衡，包括古诺型均衡和一个斯塔克伯格型均衡，其中上市公司成为追随者。然而，另一个斯塔克伯格型均衡，即上市公司成为领导者并不存在。如果引入小的库存成本，唯一的均衡结果成为Stackelberg类型的上市公司是追随者。
In this paper, I investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly, where private and state-owned public firms compete, by allowing two production periods. I find that many equilibria exist, including the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower. However, another Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist. If small inventory costs are introduced, the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the Stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower.