Papers in Philosophical Logic: Logic for equivocators
Papers in Philosophical Logic: Logic for equivocators
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哲学逻辑论文：歧义者的逻辑
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511625237.009
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发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David Lewis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David Lewis
起初，逻辑学中的关联性倡导者教导说，关联性和真理的保存是两个独立的优点，任何声称有含义的关系都同样需要这样的关系。因此，安德森和贝尔纳普在[1]：19-20中欣然同意，某些经典含义必然保留真理，但却指责他们犯下了相关的谬误。(也没有任何迹象表明，必要的真相保护可能还不够。)然而，最近，相关性不仅被称赞为一种单独的优点，还被誉为确保保存真相所必需的东西。事实证明，相关谬误的麻烦在于，它们会把我们从真理带到错误。可以肯定的是，经典含义确实保留了真理，只要句子整齐地分为真的句子和真的否定的句子。但当情况变得艰难，我们遇到否定也是真的真句子时，相关的逻辑学家就会开始工作。那么他的相关蕴涵保持真理，而一些经典蕴涵则不是。假设这是真的，它的否定CA也是真的。那么A&A就是真理的结合体，因此是真的。让B是假的，而不是真的。那么经典的有效的，但不相关的，隐含的ex也是quodlibet
At first the champions of relevance in logic taught that relevance and preservation of truth were two separate merits, equally required of any relation that claims the name of implication. Thus Anderson and Belnap, in [1]: 19-20, cheerfully agree that certain classical implications necessarily preserve truth, but fault them for committing fallacies of relevance. (And there is no hint that necessary truth-preservation might not be truth-preservation enough.) Lately, however, relevance has been praised not-or not only-as a separate merit, but rather as something needed to ensure preservation of truth. The trouble with fallacies of relevance, it turns out, is that they can take us from truth to error. Classical implication does preserve truth, to be sure, so long as sentences divide neatly into those that are true and those with true negations. But when the going gets tough, and we encounter true sentences whose negations also are true, then the relevant logician gets going. Then his relevant implication preserves truth and some classical implication doesn't. Say thatA is true and its negation cA is true as well. Then A & -A is a conjunction of truths, and hence true. LetB be false, and not true. Then the classically valid, but irrelevant, implication ex falso quodlibet