People Systematically Update Moral Judgments of Blame
People Systematically Update Moral Judgments of Blame
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DOI：
10.1037/pspa0000137
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发表时间：
2019-02-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Malle, Bertram F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Monroe, Andrew E.;Malle, Bertram F.
六个实验研究了人们的更新的责任判断和测试预测发展的社会调控的责任的角度来看。根据这一观点，在人类历史上，责备是作为一种社会代价高昂的工具来规范他人的行为。因为这对责备者和违反者来说都是代价高昂的，所以责备通常受到“保证”的要求的限制--证明一个人的道德判断是合理的证据。这一要求促使人们系统地处理围绕违规行为的因果和心理信息。也就是说，人们在利用证据放大或减轻指责时相对校准和公平。当人们更新他们的道德判断时，这种系统化的处理过程应该特别明显。使用一种新的实验范式，我们测试2套预测来自社会调节的责任的角度，并将它们与预测从动机的责任的角度进行比较。研究1-4表明（跨学生，互联网和社区样本），道德感知系统的等级更新的责任判断，以响应新的因果关系和心理信息的强度，而不锚定在初始评价。此外，这些研究表明，知觉更新指责判断对称的加剧和减轻信息，不一致的动机责备的预测。研究五表明，认知负荷下，等级化和对称化的责备更新具有鲁棒性。最后，研究6表明，偏见可能会出现，一旦社会要求的手令是放松的情况下，判断外群成员。我们的结论是，社会约束的指责判断，使正常的过程中的指责以及校准的因果关系和心理信息，偏见可能会出现这种约束时，缺席。
Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other's behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for " warrant"-evidence that one's moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and evenhanded in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test 2 sets of predictions derived from the socially regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across student, Internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations. Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions. Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load. Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed-as in the case of judging outgroup members. We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent.