Truthful online double auctions for dynamic mobile crowdsourcing
Truthful online double auctions for dynamic mobile crowdsourcing
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DOI：
10.1109/infocom.2015.7218592
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发表时间：
2015-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yue-wei Wei;Yanmin Zhu;Hongzi Zhu;Qian Zhang;Guangtao Xue
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文献类型：
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作者：
Yue-wei Wei;Yanmin Zhu;Hongzi Zhu;Qian Zhang;Guangtao Xue
刺激服务用户和服务提供者对移动的众包至关重要。已经提出了一些激励机制，但所有这些都只侧重于服务用户或服务提供商之间的单方面互动。据我们所知，我们第一次调查了移动的众包中服务用户和服务提供商之间重要的双边在线互动。我们的模型，如在线双向拍卖的互动，明确考虑到用户和供应商的动态性质。我们提出了一个总体框架，为动态移动的众包设计真实的在线双向拍卖。该框架是富有表现力的，可以与不同的价格表。我们提出了四个价格表的价格排名的在线双重拍卖，以实现该框架，这是适合于不同的场景。通过理论分析和大量的模拟，我们证明了所提出的拍卖是防策略，个人理性，并确保预算平衡。
Stimulating both service users and service providers is of paramount importance to mobile crowdsourcing. A few incentive mechanisms have been proposed, but all of them have focused only on one-sided interactions either among service users or among service providers. For the first time, to the best of our knowledge, we investigate the important two-sided online interactions among service users and service providers in mobile crowdsourcing. We model such interactions as online double auctions, explicitly taking the dynamic nature of both users and providers into account We propose a general framework for the design of truthful online double auctions for dynamic mobile crowdsourcing. The framework is expressive and can work with different price schedules. We propose price-ranked online double auctions with four price schedules to implement the framework, which are suitable for different scenarios. With theoretical analysis and extensive simulations we demonstrate that the proposed auctions are strategy-proof, individual rational, and ensure budget balance.