Augmented reality advertising in an e-commerce model with competition

Augmented reality advertising in an e-commerce model with competition
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具有竞争性的电子商务模式中的增强现实广告

DOI:
10.1016/j.elerap.2021.101092
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发表时间:
2021-09-24
影响因子:
6
通讯作者:
Shi, Tianqin
Shi, Tianqin
中科院分区:
管理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Li, Qingying;Zhu, Chen;Shi, Tianqin

文献摘要

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我们考虑一种由两个竞争零售商(零售商 A 和 B)和一个中介机构组成的电子商务模型,并研究零售商 A 在另一家零售商(零售商 B)采用 AR 广告的情况下对增强现实 (AR) 广告的决策。我们调查了两家零售商在两种渠道模式下的最佳 AR 广告水平:经销商模式和市场模式。我们发现,在两种渠道模式下,只有当AR广告的设置成本低于一定阈值(降低竞争强度)时,零售商A才会跟随零售商B使用AR广告。此外,零售商A采用AR广告作为追随者总是可以使零售商B和中间商受益。我们还确定了AR广告在不同渠道模式下对供应链绩效的影响。经销商模式下,AR广告削弱了中介的渠道力量,导致中介无法从激烈的上游竞争中获益;而在市场模式下,AR广告则缓和了渠道模式对双重边缘化的影响,使得中介不一定能从较高比例的费用中受益。我们对两种渠道模式下供应链成员绩效的比较表明,首选的渠道模式取决于竞争强度的大小和比例费用。
We consider an e-commerce model with two competing retailers (retailers A and B) and one intermediary, and study the decisions of retailer A on augmented reality (AR) advertising given that the other retailer (retailer B) has adopted AR advertising. We investigate both retailers' optimal AR advertising level under two channel modes: the reseller mode and the marketplace mode. We find that, under both channel modes, retailer A will follow retailer B in the use of AR advertising only if the set-up cost for AR advertising is below a certain threshold that decreases in competition intensity. Also, retailer A's adoption of AR advertising as a follower can always benefit retailer B and the intermediary. We also identify the impact of AR advertising on the supply chain performance under different channel modes. Under the reseller mode, AR advertising weakens the intermediary's channel power such that the intermediary may not benefit from a fierce upstream competition; whereas, under the marketplace mode, AR advertising moderates the mitigation of channel mode on double marginalization so that the intermediary does not necessarily benefit from a higher proportional fee. Our comparison of the supply chain members' performance under the two channel modes reveals that the preferred channel mode depends on the magnitude of competition intensity and proportional fee.