A Characterization of a Limit Solution for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems
A Characterization of a Limit Solution for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems
复制标题
有限视野讨价还价问题极限解的表征
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-011-0306-6
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Haruo Imai and Hannu Salonen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kojima;M.;石黒浩;近藤成一;馬場基;Haruo Imai and Hannu Salonen
本文研究了一个带有截止期的两人随机提议者讨价还价博弈。将一个有界的时间区间划分为等长的谈判期，研究了在谈判期限固定的情况下，谈判期数趋于无穷时子博弈完美均衡结果的极限.当时间范围很短时，这个极限接近于离散Raiffa解。当最后期限趋于无穷大时，极限结果收敛于时间偏好纳什解。将此极限作为最后期限下的谈判解，给出了一个公理化刻画。
We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game with a deadline. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the deadline is kept fixed. This limit is close to the discrete Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the deadline goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution. Regarding this limit as a bargaining solution under deadline, we provide an axiomatic characterization.