Optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation: A stochastic differential game approach
Optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation: A stochastic differential game approach
复制标题
生态补偿下跨界污染的最优控制：随机微分博弈方法
DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.118391
复制
发表时间：
2019-12-20
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Li, Zhendong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jiang, Ke;Merrill, Ryan;Li, Zhendong
考虑到以前被忽视的，但广泛观察到的不确定性，自然界的能力，以补充自然环境的方式，应该通知理想的设计生态补偿（EC）制度，本研究构建了一个随机微分博弈（SDG）模型来分析跨界污染控制方案之间的补偿和补偿区域。随机二人博弈中的均衡策略为最优控制理论提供了信息，揭示了一种福利分配机制，形成了改进的合作博弈契约的基础。一个基于案例的数值例子验证了理论结果，并支持三个关键的见解。首先，考虑到各种随机干扰因素，Stackelberg非合作博弈的概率污染物存量超过了合作博弈的情况。其次，只有当补偿地区环境损害的边际损失是被补偿地区的两倍以上时，EC机制才能提供长期有效的激励。帕累托最优均衡的实现依赖于一个动态的分配比例的实现，该分配比例来自于对一个稳健的福利分配机制的分析。第三，跨区域合作可靠地优于Stackelberg不合作，由于压倒性的现任经济利益或高减排成本。这项研究阐明了平衡双方利益的重要性，同时减少事前谈判过程中未观察到的环境因素的不确定性。(C)2019爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
To account for previously ignored, yet widely observed uncertainty in nature's capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation (EC) regimes, this study constructs a stochastic differential game (SDG) model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region. Equilibrium strategies in the stochastic, two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract. A case-based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights. First, accounting for various random disturbance factors, the probabilistic pollutant stock in Stackelberg non-cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation. Second, the EC mechanism provides long-term, effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region. Achieving a Pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism. Third, cross-region cooperation reliably outperforms Stackelberg non-cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs. This study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties' interests within an EC agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex-ante negotiations. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.