The impact of self-control depletion on social preferences in the ultimatum game
The impact of self-control depletion on social preferences in the ultimatum game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.joep.2015.12.005
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发表时间：
2016-04-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Wagner, Alexander K.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Achtziger, Anja;Alos-Ferrer, Carlos;Wagner, Alexander K.
我们研究了最后通牒博弈中不同动机和决策过程在决定行为中的相互作用。我们依赖于一种消耗自我控制资源的自我耗竭操纵，从而增强了默认反应的影响，或者用心理学术语来说，自动过程。实验结果提供了证据，提议者更高的报价下自我耗竭。基于一个密切相关的独裁者博弈研究的结果，该研究表明，耗尽的独裁者给比非耗尽的，我们放弃了其他关注的可能性是默认模式。相反，我们的结论是，枯竭的提案者提供更多的，因为一个战略的“拒绝恐惧”的低报价，符合自我为中心的货币问题。对于回应者来说，自我耗竭增加了接受提议的可能性，这与无条件的金钱关注比受影响的拒绝不公平提议的反应更自动。(c)2016爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
We study the interaction of different motives and decision processes in determining behavior in the ultimatum game. We rely on an ego-depletion manipulation which consumes self-control resources, thereby enhancing the influence of default reactions, or in psychological terms, automatic processes. Experimental results provide evidence that proposers make higher offers under ego depletion. Based on findings from a closely related dictator game study, which shows that depleted dictators give less than non-depleted ones, we discard the possibility that other-regarding concerns are the default mode. Instead, we conclude that depleted proposers offer more because of a strategic 'fear of rejection' of low offers, consistent with self-centered monetary concerns. For responders, ego depletion increases the likelihood to accept offers, in line with unconditional monetary concerns being more automatic than affect-influenced reactions to reject unfair offers. (c) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.