Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?
Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?
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银行业大型合并的激励措施：监管机构可以从事件研究证据中推断出哪些动机？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Kane
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Kane
在方法论上，本文将任何合并的机会成本定义为它排除或推迟的替代交易的价值。这挑战了标准的事件研究假设，即股票市场以合伙人在独立活动中获得的利润来衡量合并交易的价值。实质上，本文发现，银行业的巨型合并显示出两个与规模相关的例外，收购方股票价值往往不受影响或下降时，合并宣布的原型结果。美国大型银行机构从变得越来越庞大中获得价值，并在吸收州内竞争对手时获得额外价值。
Methodologically, this paper frames the opportunity cost of any merger as the value of the alternative deals it precludes or defers. This challenges the standard event-study hypothesis that stock markets benchmark the value of a merger deal by the profits the partners would have earned in stand-alone activity. Substantively, the paper finds that megamergers in banking show two size-related exceptions to the prototypical result that acquirer stock value tends to be unaffected or to fall when a merger is announced. Giant U.S. banking organizations gain value from becoming more gigantic and gain additional value when they absorb an in-state competitor.