A defence of informational structural realism
A defence of informational structural realism
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DOI：
10.1007/s11229-007-9163-z
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发表时间：
2007-03
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
L. Floridi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Floridi
这是在第一届澳大利亚计算与哲学会议(CAP@AU；堪培拉的澳大利亚国立大学，2003年10月31日至11月2日)上发表的主旨演讲的修订版。本文分为两个部分。第一部分为结构现实主义的信息方法辩护。它分三个步骤做到这一点。首先，在关于结构实在论的争论中，认识论和本体论的结构实在论是可以调和的。由此得出的结论是，从有利于结构主义的立场来看，OSR的一个版本是可以辩护的。其次，有人认为OSR的一个版本也是合理的，因为并不是所有的Relata(结构化实体)在逻辑上都先于关系(结构)。第三，通过从信息对象的角度建立结构对象的本体，证明了OSR的一个版本也适用于次可观测(不可观测和仅仪器可观测)和可观测实体。其结果是信息结构实在论，这是OSR的一个版本，支持将世界视为相互动态交互的信息对象的整体的本体论承诺。几位同事讨论了这份文件，并在下半部分答复了对该提案提出的十项反对意见，以进一步澄清该提案。
This is the revised version of an invited keynote lecture delivered at the1st Australian Computing and Philosophy Conference(CAP@AU; the Australian National University in Canberra, 31 October–2 November, 2003). The paper is divided into two parts. The first part defends an informational approach to structural realism. It does so in three steps. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of OSR is also plausible, because not allrelata(structured entities) are logically prior to relations (structures). Third, it is shown that a version of OSR is also applicable to both sub-observable (unobservable and instrumentally-only observable) and observable entities, by developing its ontology of structural objects in terms of informational objects. The outcome isinformational structural realism, a version of OSR supporting the ontological commitment to a view of the world as the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. The paper has been discussed by several colleagues and, in the second half, ten objections that have been moved to the proposal are answered in order to clarify it further.