Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting
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采购合同中的道德风险与逆向选择
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0100
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
D. Conn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
James C. Cox;R.Mark Isacc;P. Cech;D. Conn
摘要建立了一种采购合同模型，并在实验室实验中进行了验证。给出了固定价格合同和成本分担合同的市场绩效结果。合同以第一价格密封投标或第二价格密封投标的方式授予。环境中包含拍卖后成本的不确定性和合同成本降低中不受监督的努力的机会。成本分担合同减少了采购费用，但由于其诱发的道德风险浪费和成本超支，效率低下。经济文献分类号：C72、C92、D44、D61、D82、H57、L14。
Abstract A model of procurement contracting is developed and tested in laboratory experiments. Market performance results are presented for both fixed-price and cost-sharing contracts. Contracts are awarded with first-price sealed-bid or second-price sealed-bid auctions. The environment contains post-auction cost uncertainty and opportunity for unmonitored effort in contract cost reduction. Cost-sharing contracts are found to reduce procurement expense but also to be inefficient because of their induced moral hazard waste and cost overruns. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D44, D61, D82, H57, L14.