When logic fails: Implicit transitive inference in humans
When logic fails: Implicit transitive inference in humans
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DOI：
10.3758/bf03195340
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发表时间：
2005-06-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
O'Reilly, RC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Frank, MJ;Rudy, JW;O'Reilly, RC
动物中的传递性推理（TI）（例如，在知道A优于B和B优于C的基础上选择A而不是C）已经被某些人解释为反映了声明性逻辑推理过程。我们通过提供证据证明人类可以在更简单的联想机制的基础上表现出类似TI的行为来逆转这种拟人化的解释，这些机制是许多动物学习理论的基础。在这项研究中，人类参与者接受了五对TI问题（A+B-，B+C-，C+D-，D+E-，E+F-）的培训，与以前的人类TI研究不同，他们被阻止明确意识到逻辑层次，因此无法进行逻辑推理。然后，他们被测试了三个问题：B对D，B对E，以及C对E。参与者只可靠地选择了B而不是E，而其他测试条件产生了机会表现。这一结果与逻辑推理的使用不一致，而是与解释早期TI对大鼠进行的研究的解释一致，这些研究发现了相同的结果模式。在这个帐户中，选择性能是基于不同的联想强度的刺激项目，开发的培训，尽管平等的公开强化。
Transitive inference (TI) in animals (e.g., choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C) has been interpreted by some as reflecting a declarative logical inference process. We invert this anthropomorphic interpretation by providing evidence that humans can exhibit TI-like behavior on the basis of simpler associative mechanisms that underlie many theories of animal learning. In this study, human participants were trained on a five-pair TI problem (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, E+F-) and, unlike in previous human TI studies, were prevented from becoming explicitly aware of the logical hierarchy, so they could not employ logical reasoning. They were then tested with three problems: B versus D, B versus E, and C versus E. Participants only reliably chose B over E, whereas the other test conditions yielded chance performance. This result is inconsistent with the use of logical reasoning and is instead consistent with an account developed to explain earlier TI studies with rats that found the same pattern of results. In this account, choice performance is based on differential associative strengths across the stimulus items that develop over training, despite equal overt reinforcement.