MEASURING MARKET POWER IN THE READY-TO-EAT CEREAL INDUSTRY BY AVIV NEVO
MEASURING MARKET POWER IN THE READY-TO-EAT CEREAL INDUSTRY BY AVIV NEVO
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AVIV NEVO 衡量即食谷物行业的市场力量
DOI:
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发表时间:
2001
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Catherine Wolfram
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Steven T. Berry;E. Berndt;T. Bresnahan;D. Cutler;J. Hausman;Igal Hendel;Kei Hirano;John D. Horn;Joanne McLean;A. Pakes;Robert L. Porter;James Powell;J. V. Reenen;R. Schmalensee;S. Wahba;F. Wolak;Catherine Wolfram
The ready-to-eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration, high price-cost margins, large advertising-to-sales ratios, and numerous introductions of new products. Previous researchers have concluded that the ready-to-eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition. This paper empirically examines this conclusion. In particular, I estimate price-cost margins, but more importantly I am able empirically to separate these margins Ž . Ž . into three sources: i that which is due to product differentiation; ii that which is due to Ž . multi-product firm pricing; and iii that due to potential price collusion. The results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal, the first two effects explain most of the observed price-cost margins. I conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior, despite the high price-cost margins. Leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality. It is these two factors that lead to high price-cost margins.