Strategic deception in agents
Strategic deception in agents
复制标题
代理商的战略欺骗
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Young
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Christian;R. Young
代理商之间的信任是对多基因系统的一个充分研究的关注，但其对应物，欺骗和值得关注。在我们的研究领域，互动叙事的生成中，欺骗研究对于有趣和互动故事的发展至关重要。我们描述一种算法，该算法解释了欺骗者如何欺骗目标代理人，以鼓励目标代理人达到目标。一套不受欢迎的目标。该算法使用改进的计划过程来确定未知目标的实现，同时考虑被欺骗的代理人的目标。
Trust between agents is a well-studied concern for multiagent systems, but its counterpart, deception, deserves as much attention. In our area of research, interactive narrative generation, the study of deception is critical to the development of interesting and interactive stories.We describe an algorithm that explains how a deceiving agent might deceive a target agent in order to encourage the target agent to achieve a set of unspoken goals. The algorithm uses a modified planning process to ascertain the achievement of the unspoken goals while considering the goals of the deceived agent.