Pilot Spoofing Attack Detection and Countermeasure
Pilot Spoofing Attack Detection and Countermeasure
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DOI：
10.1109/tcomm.2018.2797989
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发表时间：
2018-01
影响因子：
8.3
通讯作者：
Jitendra Tugnait
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jitendra Tugnait
在时分双工多天线系统中，可以使用反向训练来估计信道状态信息。当在训练阶段，对手(欺骗者)也发送与合法接收者相同的同步训练(飞行员)信号时，就会发生飞行员欺骗(污染)攻击。这污染了信道估计并改变了合法的波束成形/预编码器设计，从而促进了窃听。最近的一种方法提出在合法接收端将随机序列叠加在训练序列上，然后使用最小描述长度(MDL)准则来检测导频污染攻击。在本文中，我们通过估计合法的接收者和窃听者的信道，以及安全的波束形成来增强这种方法，以减轻导频欺骗的影响。我们考虑两种情况：1)欺骗者只发送导频信号；2)欺骗者还向其导频添加随机序列，模仿合法的接收者。我们还使用了一种基于随机矩阵理论的信源枚举方法来代替MDL，用于欺骗检测，从而提高了检测性能。通过仿真说明了所提出的检测和抑制方法。
In a time-division duplex multiple antenna system, the channel state information can be estimated using reverse training. A pilot spoofing (contamination) attack occurs when during the training phase, an adversary (spoofer) also sends synchronized, identical training (pilot) signal as that of the legitimate receiver. This contaminates channel estimation and alters the legitimate beamforming/precoder design, facilitating eavesdropping. A recent approach proposed superimposing a random sequence on the training sequence at the legitimate receiver and then using the minimum description length (MDL) criterion to detect pilot contamination attack. In this paper, we augment this approach with estimation of both legitimate receiver and eavesdropper channels, and secure beamforming, to mitigate the effects of pilot spoofing. We consider two cases: 1) the spoofer transmits only the pilot signal and 2) the spoofer also adds a random sequence to its pilot, mimicking the legitimate receiver. We also employ a random matrix theory-based source enumeration approach instead of MDL, for spoofing detection, leading to improved detection performance. The proposed detection and mitigation approaches are illustrated via simulations.