Moody’s investors service response to the consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision “A new capital adequacy framework”
Moody’s investors service response to the consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision “A new capital adequacy framework”
复制标题
穆迪投资者服务对巴塞尔银行监管委员会发布的咨询文件“新资本充足率框架”的回应
DOI：
10.1016/s0378-4266(00)00121-7
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Richard M Cantor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richard M Cantor
穆迪支持巴塞尔委员会的提议，即利用银行内部风险评估来完善《巴塞尔协议》对银行资产和承诺的风险权重。外部风险评估，如穆迪的信用评级，可能会作为银行内部评级系统的直接输入，以及作为基准和验证这些系统的工具，发挥辅助作用。然而，在监管中广泛使用评级，随着时间的推移，可能会增加评级购买，降低评级机构的独立性，减少创新和提高评级质量的动力，从而破坏信贷质量。本文讨论了银行监管机构如何利用外部评级，以减轻评级机构服务的监管需求所产生的不利激励。
Moody's endorses the Basel Committee's proposal to use banks' internal risk assessments to refine the Basel Accord's risk weights on bank assets and commitments. External risk assessments, such as Moody's credit ratings, will likely play a supporting role as direct inputs into banks' internal rating systems and as tools for benchmarking and validating those systems. However, the widespread use of ratings in regulation threatens to undermine the quality of credit over time by increasing rating shopping, decreasing rating agency independence, and reducing incentives to innovate and improve the quality of ratings. This paper discusses how bank regulators can use external ratings in ways that mitigate the adverse incentives created by the resulting regulatory demand for rating agency services.