Off-Limits: Abusing Legacy x86 Memory Segmentation to Spy on Enclaved Execution
Off-Limits: Abusing Legacy x86 Memory Segmentation to Spy on Enclaved Execution
复制标题
限制：滥用传统 x86 内存分段来监视 Enclaved 执行
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Raoul Strackx
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jago Gyselinck;Jo Van Bulck;Frank Piessens;Raoul Strackx
英特尔SGX等封闭式执行环境支持关键应用组件的安全、硬件强制隔离执行，而无需信任底层操作系统或虚拟机管理程序。然而，最近的一系列研究探索了由不受信任的系统软件安装的创新控制通道攻击，以部分损害飞地程序的机密性。除了利用相对知名的侧通道（如CPU缓存和分支预测器）之外，这些攻击迄今为止还集中在通过分页单元跟踪飞地地址转换的副作用。
Enclaved execution environments, such as Intel SGX, enable secure, hardware-enforced isolated execution of critical application components without having to trust the underlying operating system or hypervisor. A recent line of research, however, explores innovative controlled-channel attacks mounted by untrusted system software to partially compromise the confidentiality of enclave programs. Apart from exploiting relatively well-known side-channels like the CPU cache and branch predictor, these attacks have so far focused on tracking side-effects from enclaved address translations via the paging unit.