Towards side channel secure cyber-physical systems
Towards side channel secure cyber-physical systems
复制标题
迈向侧通道安全网络物理系统
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Bayat
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Marzieh Ashrafiamiri;Amir Hosein Afandizadeh Zargari;Seyed Mohammad;S. Bayat
网络物理系统包含联网的嵌入式系统。这样的系统可以实现用于处理和/或通信的密码算法。因此，它们可能容易受到旁路攻击。差分功耗分析是此类攻击之一，被认为是对密码设备最严重的威胁之一。已经提出了各种度量来评估不同实现对这些攻击的抵抗力。其中一些指标需要进行旁路攻击，并取决于所考虑的功率模型。由于提出的侧信道攻击和功率模型的种类繁多，在这些指标下综合评估设计通常被认为是一项繁琐的任务。为了缓解这种情况，人们提出了t检验。T检验的非特定变异量不需要假设用于泄漏评估的幂模型。在本文中，我们评估了三种高级加密标准在现场可编程门阵列上的实现。在第一种设计中，没有实现旁路对抗，而第二种和第三种实现分别利用了掩蔽和混洗。评估结果表明，当采用掩蔽或洗牌时，可以显著降低旁道泄漏。结果表明，洗牌和掩蔽分别是区域受限和时间受限设备的合适选择。
Cyber-physical systems contain networked embedded systems. Such systems may implement cryptographic algorithms for processing and/or communication. Therefore, they can be prone to side-channel attacks. Differential power analysis is one of such attacks, which is considered among the most serious threats against cryptographic devices. Various metrics have been proposed to evaluate the resistance of different implementations against these attacks. Some of these metrics need side-channel attacks to be conducted and depend on the considered power model. Due to the vast variety of proposed side-channel attacks and power models, comprehensively evaluating a design under these metrics is commonly considered to be a tedious task. To alleviate this situation, t-test has been proposed. The non-specific variation of t-test does not need to suppose a power model for leakage assessment. In this paper, we have evaluated three implementations of AES on an FPGA. In the first design, no side-channel countermeasure is implemented while the second and the third implementations make use of masking and shuffling, respectively. Evaluation results show that significant reduction occurs in terms of side-channel leakage when masking or shuffling is applied. Results imply that shuffling and masking are proper choices for area-restricted and time-restricted devices, respectively.