On the Internal Balance of Party Power: Party Organizations in New Democracies
On the Internal Balance of Party Power: Party Organizations in New Democracies
复制标题
论政党权力的内部制衡：新民主国家的政党组织
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ingrid van Biezen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ingrid van Biezen
本文主要研究南欧和中东欧相对较新的民主国家中党中央办公室与公职政党之间的关系。分析表明，虽然党的行政人员受到公职人员的强烈侵犯，但与预期相反，不是公职党，而是党中央办公室，成为两张面孔中最主要的一张。这些新民主国家的政党组织似乎基本上是由一个小的权力中心控制的，这个权力中心位于议会外组织和公职政党的交叉点。有人认为，这一现象最好解释为一种手段，以提高政党凝聚力，减少对政党忠诚度不高和政党制度化普遍缺乏的背景下可能产生的不稳定后果。
This paper focuses on the relationship between the party central office and the party in public office in the relatively new democracies of Southern and East Central Europe. The analysis reveals that, although the party executives are strongly invaded by public office holders, it is, contrary to expectations, not the party in public office but the party central office that emerges as the most predominant of the two faces. It appears that party organizations in these new democracies are largely controlled from a small centre of power, located at the intersection of the extra-parliamentary organization and the party in public office. This phenomenon, it is argued, can probably be best explained as a device to increase party cohesion and to reduce the potentially destabilizing consequences that emerge from a context of weakly developed party loyalties and a general lack of party institutionalization.