Downward Wage Rigidity in a Model of Equal Treatment Contracting*
Downward Wage Rigidity in a Model of Equal Treatment Contracting*
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平等待遇契约模型中的工资刚性下降*
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01628.x
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Martins P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Martins P
根据 Bewley (1999a) 的见解，本文分析了一个具有向下刚性的模型，在该模型中，企业不能根据进入企业的年份进行差别支付，并建立了工资和失业的均衡模型。我们解决了工资刚性下降条件下工资和失业的动态，前瞻性企业考虑了这些限制。我们证明，在确定性的情况下，存在一种前置激励，可以带来简单的解决方案。使用战后美国经济的生产率数据，我们分析了该模型匹配某些程式化劳动力市场事实的能力。
Following insights by Bewley (1999a), this paper analyses a model with downward rigidities in which firms cannot pay discriminately based on year of entry to the firm, and develops an equilibrium model of wages and unemployment. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment under conditions of downward wage rigidity, where forward‐looking firms take into account these constraints. We show that there is a frontloading incentive that leads to a simple solution in the case of certainty. Using productivity data from the postwar US economy, we analyse the ability of the model to match certain stylised labour market facts.