Bargaining in a Three-Person Game
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game
复制标题
三人游戏中的讨价还价
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1967
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
W. Riker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Riker
游戏是许多政治事件的范例，特别是那些涉及参与者之间部分或完全利益冲突的事件。作为范式，它们在相对简单的社会互动中展示了与它们共享结构的更大政治事件的更复杂互动中发现的相同的基本力量。这是游戏的特点，使它们成为社会科学理论和实验的吸引力工具。科学的期望是，通过研究游戏的准政治互动（其中行为的制度、心理和意识形态成分之间的差异被最小化），人们将能够更深刻地理解讨价还价、形成联盟的基本政治活动和选择策略。这种更深刻的理解是获得以下问题答案的结果：（1）当假设参与者是理性的并希望最大化效用时，数学解是什么，也就是说，期望参与者获得多少效用？(2)什么策略（或游戏方法）可以确保玩家实现解决方案？对第一个问题的回答表明，政治事件的结果可能是什么。如果我们知道这一点，那么，如果我们也可以假设参与者是理性的效用最大化者，我们就可以有一定的信心预测政治未来。第二个问题（关于策略）的答案允许政治工程师向政治家提供关于如何成功行事的建议。
Games are paradigms of many political events, especially those that involve partial or complete conflicts of interest among the participants. As paradigms, they display in relatively simple social interaction the same fundamental forces found in the more complex interactions of the grander political events whose structure they share. This is the feature of games that makes them attractive vehicles for both theorizing and experimentation in the social sciences. The scientific expectation is that, by studying the quasi-political interaction of games—where the variations among institutional, psychological, and ideological components of behavior are minimized—one will be able to understand more profoundly the basic political activities of bargaining, forming coalitions, and choosing strategies. This more profound understanding is a consequence of obtaining answers to the following questions: (1) What is the mathematical solution, that is, what amount of utility can players be expected to obtain, when it is assumed that players are rational and wish to maximize utility? (2) What is the strategy (or method of playing) that will ensure players of achieving the solution? An answer to the first question indicates what may be anticipated as the outcome of political events. If we know it, then, if also we can assume players are rational maximizers of utility, we can predict the political future with some confidence. An answer to the second question (about strategies) permits political engineers to give advice to politicians about how to behave successfully.