Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield
Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield
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下放可分割主权：扫除概念雷区
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
David A. Lake
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David A. Lake
将主权下放给国际组织（IOs）越来越普遍，也越来越有争议。我在三个索赔解决目前的争议的来源。第一，主权显然是可以分割的，尽管并非如此。从实践来看，不可分割性不应成为向国际组织授权的障碍。第二，直觉告诉我们，更长的授权链更容易失败。然而，重要的不是链条本身的长度，而是成功授权的可识别条件是否得到满足。第三，虽然“授权”通常被用来指两者，但授权和集中主权是不同的活动。人们对IO的大部分担忧实际上是集中而不是委派主权。
Delegating sovereignty to international organizations (IOs) is both increasingly common and controversial. I address the sources of current controversies in three claims. First, although alleged otherwise, sovereignty is eminently divisible. From practice, indivisibility should not be a barrier to delegating to IOs. Second, it is intuitive that longer chains of delegation will be more likely to fail. Yet, it is not the length of the chain per se that matters as whether identifiable conditions for successful delegation are satisfied. Third, although “delegation” is often used to refer to both, delegating and pooling sovereignty are distinct activities. Much of the concern with IOs is really about pooling rather than delegating sovereignty.