Negotiation over offspring care - how should parents respond to each other's efforts?
Negotiation over offspring care - how should parents respond to each other's efforts?
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DOI：
10.1093/beheco/arl009
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发表时间：
2006-09-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Hinde, Camilla A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Johnstone, Rufus A.;Hinde, Camilla A.
双亲照顾模式预测，父母应该补偿不完全的任何变化，他们的合作伙伴的投资。然而，实验测试产生的结果范围从完全补偿，通过没有任何反应，到匹配的反应。在这里，我们提出了一个新的，适应性的解释这种变化。基于McNamara等人开发的方法，我们将育雏需求或价值的不确定性纳入双亲就后代护理进行谈判的博弈论模型中。我们表明，当每个父母只有部分信息，更大的努力投资的一个作为一个信号，其他育雏需要。这有利于一个匹配的反应，由焦点父母的配偶，而增加努力的影响，投资的边际价值有利于补偿性反应。最终结果取决于这两种效应的相对强度。育雏需要的变化越大，与父母的状态相比，较弱的预测水平的补偿，更有可能发生匹配。我们的模型还表明了为什么男性和女性可能会对彼此做出不同的反应。如果它们之间存在信息不对称，那么更了解育雏需求的父母应该更加努力地工作，对育雏需求的变化做出更强烈的反应，对喂养成本的变化不那么敏感，并且更强烈地补偿伴侣努力的变化。如果这种不对称性非常大，信息不灵通的父母甚至可能与其伴侣的工作率变化相匹配。
Models of biparental care predict that parents should compensate incompletely for any change in their partner's investment. Experimental tests have, however, yielded results that range from full compensation, through a lack of any reaction, to a matching response. Here we suggest a new, adaptive explanation for such variation. Building on an approach developed by McNamara et al., we incorporate uncertainty regarding brood need or value into a game-theoretical model of biparental negotiation over offspring care. We show that when each parent has only partial information, greater effort invested by one serves as a signal to the other of brood need. This favors a matching response by the focal parent's mate, whereas the impact of increased effort on the marginal value of investment favors a compensatory response. The net outcome depends on the relative strength of these two effects. The greater the variation in brood need compared with parental state, the weaker the predicted level of compensation, and the more likely matching is to occur. Our model also suggests why males and females might respond differently to each other. If there is an informational asymmetry between them, then the parent that is better informed about brood need should work harder, respond more strongly to changes in brood need, be less sensitive to changes in the cost of feeding, and compensate more strongly for changes in partner effort. If the asymmetry is very great, the poorly informed parent may even match changes in its partner's work rate.