Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment?
Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment?
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劳资委员会是否抑制投资？
DOI：
10.1177/001979390706000202
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Wagner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Addison;C. Schnabel;J. Wagner
理论表明，企业在处理工作场所工会主义时面临着一个阻碍问题：工会将占用来自长期资本的部分准租金。因此，企业可能会通过减少投资来限制寻租风险。美国的证据清楚地表明了这个方向。本文的作者调查了德国工会（相当于该国工作场所工会主义）是否也是如此。利用 1998 年至 2003 年的企业面板数据，他们没有发现任何证据表明劳资委员会的成立对投资产生了不利影响，或其解散对投资产生了有利影响。
Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi-rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent-seeking by reducing investments. The U.S. evidence points clearly in this direction. The authors of this paper investigate whether the same is true for German works councils, the analogue of workplace unionism in that nation. Using establishment panel data for the years 1998–2003, they find no evidence that a works council's formation adversely affected investment or that its dissolution favorably affected investment.