Pricing and Capacity Rationing with Customer Disappointment Aversion
Pricing and Capacity Rationing with Customer Disappointment Aversion
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DOI：
10.1111/poms.12018
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发表时间：
2013-09
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Qian Liu;Stephen Shum
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Qian Liu;Stephen Shum
当经济结果达不到预期时，消费者不愿感到失望。在本研究中，我们研究了一个两时期的模型，在这个模型中，企业可以在任何一个时期进行配给。考虑到由于缺货可能导致的失望，战略客户决定何时购买，公司决定每个时期的价格和配给水平。我们探讨了失望厌恶对顾客战略购买行为和企业定价配给决策的影响。在没有失望厌恶的情况下，企业采用统一的价格政策而不实行定量配给是最优的。然而，当战略客户不愿失望时，公司可能能够通过适当的配给水平来增加利润。我们分析了涨价和降价政策。我们表明，在降价的情况下，企业总是通过在低价格时期使用适当水平的配给而从失望厌恶行为中获益。然而，在加价的情况下，诱导失望厌恶行为是否对公司有利，取决于客户在形成公用事业的不同时期如何构建回报。特别是，当客户将不同时期的收益划分为公用事业时，公司不应诱导失望厌恶行为。
Customers are averse to disappointment that arises when economic outcomes fall short of expectations. In this study, we study a two‐period model in which the firm may create rationing in either period. In the anticipation of possible disappointment due to stock‐outs, strategic customers decide when to purchase and the firm determines the prices and rationing levels in each period. We explore the impact of disappointment aversion on customers' strategic purchasing behavior and the firm's pricing and rationing decisions. Without disappointment aversion, it is optimal for the firm to adopt a uniform pricing policy without rationing. However, when strategic customers are averse to disappointment, a firm may be able to increase profits with an appropriate level of rationing. We analyze both the mark‐up and mark‐down policies. We show that, in a mark‐down scenario, the firm always benefits from disappointment aversion behavior by using an appropriate level of rationing in a low‐price period. However, in a mark‐up scenario, whether it is beneficial for the firm to induce disappointment aversion behavior depends on how customers frame payoffs in different periods when forming utilities. Particularly, when customers compartmentalize payoffs in different periods to form utilities, the firm should not induce disappointment aversion behavior.