We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: Testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets
We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: Testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets
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我们知道你在哪里，你在做什么，我们会抓住你：在数字毒品市场中测试威慑理论
DOI：
10.1093/bjc/azx021
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Isak Ladegaard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Isak Ladegaard
高度公开的惩罚事件会减少犯罪吗？执法部门的公共关系工作是否减少了犯罪？这些长期存在的问题在一个新的环境中得到了解决——数字药物市场。对两个大型非法电子商务网站的贸易数据进行了分析，这些数据是在10个月的时间里每天收集的，研究了市场收入如何受到以下因素的影响：(1)媒体对警方在这些市场上工作的报道；(2)对市场创始人的定罪和终身监禁的高度宣传。在媒体报道增多的时期以及两起法庭事件之后，贸易有所增长。在对三个与非法电子商务相关的在线论坛的文本对话进行分析后，对审判结果后贸易增长的可能解释进行了讨论。
Is crime reduced by highly publicized punishment events? Is crime reduced by law enforcement’s public relations work? These longstanding questions are addressed in a novel context—digital drug markets. An analysis of trade data from two large and illegal e-commerce websites, collected on a daily basis for ten months, examined how market revenue was affected by (1) media coverage of police work on such markets and (2) the highly publicized conviction and life-sentencing of a market founder. Trade increased after periods with elevated media coverage, and also after the two court events. Possible explanations for the increase in trade after the trial outcomes are discussed in an analysis of textual conversations in three online forums associated with illegal e-commerce.