Assortative and dissortative priorities for game interaction and strategy adaptation significantly bolster network reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma
Assortative and dissortative priorities for game interaction and strategy adaptation significantly bolster network reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma
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DOI：
10.1088/1742-5468/2014/05/p05003
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发表时间：
2014-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Tanimoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Tanimoto
在2 × 2囚徒困境博弈中，网络互惠是增加社会粘性的一种机制，从而导致合作均衡。在这里，我们表明，将选择游戏合作伙伴的过程与选择适应合作伙伴的过程相结合可以显着增强合作，尽管此类选择过程需要额外的成本来收集有关应选择哪个邻居的进一步信息。基于我们的模型所产生的动力学的详细调查，我们发现，高水平的合作结果从两种行为：合作者倾向于与合作者互动，以防止被利用的叛逃者和叛逃者倾向于选择合作者利用，尽管一些叛逃者转换为合作者的可能性。
In 2 × 2 prisoner’s dilemma games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, which leads to cooperative equilibrium. Here we show that combining the process for selecting a gaming partner with the process for selecting an adaptation partner significantly enhances cooperation, even though such selection processes require additional costs to collect further information concerning which neighbor should be chosen. Based on elaborate investigations of the dynamics generated by our model, we find that high levels of cooperation result from two kinds of behavior: cooperators tend to interact with cooperators to prevent being exploited by defectors and defectors tend to choose cooperators to exploit despite the possibility that some defectors convert to cooperators.