Contract design as a firm capability: An integration of learning and transaction cost perspectives
Contract design as a firm capability: An integration of learning and transaction cost perspectives
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DOI：
10.5465/amr.2007.26585739
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发表时间：
2007-10
影响因子：
16.4
通讯作者：
Nicholas Argyres;Kyle J. Mayer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nicholas Argyres;Kyle J. Mayer
我们的目标是为详细的商业合同拆解合同设计能力，得出这些能力在公司内的位置的影响，并研究将这些能力作为竞争优势的潜在来源的影响。我们认为，开发合同设计能力包括学习在合同中包含多少细节以及包含哪些类型的细节。我们进一步认为，关于这些权衡的管理知识存在于经理、工程师和律师对不同类型的合同条款的不同方面。
Our aim is to unpack contract design capabilities for detailed commercial contracts, to draw out implications for the locus of such capabilities within the firm, and to examine implications for exploiting those capabilities as a potential source of competitive advantage. We argue that developing contract design capabilities involves learning how much and what kinds of detail to include in a contract. We further argue that knowledge about the management of these trade-offs resides differentially in managers, engineers, and lawyers regarding different types of contractual provisions.