Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics
Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics
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自由贸易区和原产地规则：经济和政治
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00307.x
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Panagariya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Rupa Duttagupta;A. Panagariya
本文将中间投入纳入一个小联盟一般均衡模型，首先发展了原产地规则下优惠贸易的福利经济学，然后论证了原产地规则可以提高自由贸易协定的政治可行性。由此得出了两个有趣的结果。首先，在没有ROO的情况下被拒绝的减少福利的自由贸易协定在这些规则存在的情况下变得可行。其次，在没有RoO的情况下被拒绝的福利改善自由贸易协定在他们面前得到认可，但一旦认可，它就变得比现状更差。
Incorporating intermediate inputs into a small-union general-equilibrium model, this paper first develops the welfare economics of preferential trading under the rules of origin (ROO) and then demonstrates that the ROO could improve the political viability of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Two interesting outcomes are derived. First, a welfare reducing FTA that was rejected in the absence of the ROO becomes feasible in the presence of these rules. Second, a welfare improving FTA that was rejected in the absence of the ROO is endorsed in their presence, but upon endorsement it becomes welfare inferior relative to the status quo.