Positional scoring-based allocation of indivisible goods
Positional scoring-based allocation of indivisible goods
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DOI:
10.1007/s10458-016-9340-x
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发表时间:
2016-08
影响因子:
1.9
通讯作者:
Dorothea Baumeister;S. Bouveret;J. Lang;Nhan-Tam Nguyen;T. Nguyen;J. Rothe;Abdallah Saffidine
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Dorothea Baumeister;S. Bouveret;J. Lang;Nhan-Tam Nguyen;T. Nguyen;J. Rothe;Abdallah Saffidine
We define a family of rules for dividingmindivisible goods among agents, parameterized by a scoring vector and a social welfare aggregation function. We assume that agents’ preferences over sets of goods are additive, but that the input is ordinal: each agent reports her preferences simply by ranking single goods. Similarly to positional scoring rules in voting, a scoring vectorconsists ofmnonincreasing, nonnegative weights, whereis the score of a good assigned to an agent who ranks it in positioni. The global score of an allocation for an agent is the sum of the scores of the goods assigned to her. The social welfare of an allocation is the aggregation of the scores of all agents, for some aggregation functionsuch as, typically,or. The rule associated withsandmaps a profile to (one of) the allocation(s) maximizing social welfare. After defining this family of rules, and focusing on some key examples, we investigate some of the social-choice-theoretic properties of this family of rules, such as various kinds of monotonicity, and separability. Finally, we focus on the computation of winning allocations, and on their approximation: we show that for commonly used scoring vectors and aggregation functions this problem is NP-hard and we exhibit some tractable particular cases.